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Abstract
In his recent paper “QBism, FAPP and the Quantum Omelette,” de
Ronde makes a variety of questionable claims concerning QBism, Bohr,
and the present author’s critical appraisal of QBism. These claims are
examined. Subsequently an outline is presented of what one might see
if one looks into the quantum domain through the window provided
by the quantum-mechanical correlations between outcome-indicating
events in the classical domain.
The formalism of quantum mechanics (QM) was characterized by Jaynes
[1] as “a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature, in part in-
complete human information about Nature—all scrambled up by Heisenberg
and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen how to unscramble.” The
(alleged) improper scrambling of ontic (“objective”) and epistemic (“sub-
jective”) perspectives is the focus of a recent paper by de Ronde [2]. What
mainly concerns me here is his defense of QBism, which he regards as “one
of the most honest, consistent and clear approaches to QM” and as “com-
pletely safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received,”
including one by the present author [3], notwithstanding that it “does not
solve the problems of QM, it simply dissolves them.” In their response to
Nauenberg [4], another critic of QBism, the QBist triumvirate Fuchs et al.
[5] “welcome criticism, but urge critics to pay some attention to what we
are saying.” I could say the same of de Ronde’s throwaway remarks on my
critique of QBism.
What follows is divided into two parts. The first part deals with Bohr,
QBism, and what de Ronde has to say about Bohr, QBism, and my critical
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appraisal of QBism. The second part outlines what one might see if one looks
into the quantum domain through the window provided by the quantum-
mechanical correlations between outcome-indicating events in the classical
domain.
1
All de Ronde quotes from my critical appraisal of QBism is the distinction
I made between
(I) a transcendental reality external to the subject, undisclosed in expe-
rience, which Kant looked upon as the intrinsically unknowable cause
of subjective experience, and
(II) the product of a mental synthesis—a synthesis based on the spatiotem-
poral structure of experience, achieved with the help of spatiotemporal
concepts, and resulting in an objective reality from which the objecti-
fying subject can abstract itself.
It is true that within the Kantian scheme, as de Ronde explains, “transcen-
dental reality amounts to reality as it is, ‘the thing in itself’.” It ought to be
noted, however, that I carefully avoided the vacuous expression “reality as
it is” (in and by itself, out of relation to our experience and our categorial
schemes). To acknowledge a transcendental reality is but to recognize that
there is more to reality than what is disclosed in human experience and can
be captured by mathematical models or mental constructs. An objective
reality constructed by us is the one we physicists will ever be concerned
with, whether we want it or not, whether or not we think of it (rightly or
wrongly but in any case irrelevantly1) as a faithful representation of “reality
as it is.”
De Ronde flatly denies “that QM can be considered in terms of ‘objective
reality’ within the Bohrian scheme.” Why? Because “[t]he subject cannot
abstract himself from the definition of reality provided by QM in terms of
waves, particles or even definite valued properties.” It is news to me that
QM provides a definition of (objective) reality, let alone one in terms of pos-
sessed definite properties or classical models like waves or particles. Where
Bohr is concerned, objective reality2 is made up of two things: (i) the exper-
1As Xenophanes observed some twenty-five centuries ago, even if my conceptions rep-
resented the world exactly as it is, I could never know that this is the case.
2I am of course not speaking of transcendental reality, whose relation to QM did not
concern Bohr.
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imental arrangement—the system preparation, the measurement apparatus,
and the indicated outcome—all of which have to be described in ordinary
(“classical”) language if we want to be able to communicate “what we have
done and what we have learned” ([6, pp. 3, 24] and [7, pp. 39, 72, 89]),
and (ii) “statistical laws governing observations obtained under conditions
specified in plain language.” That’s all there is to it: “the physical content
of quantum mechanics is exhausted by its power to formulate” such laws [6,
p. 12].
De Ronde argues that because Bohr’s notion of complementarity in-
volves a subject’s choice, it is inconsistent with an objective conception of
reality: “Physical reality can be only represented in an objective manner if
the subject plays no essential role within that representation.” Was Bohr
then mistaken in writing that the “description of atomic phenomena has
. . . a perfectly objective character, in the sense that no explicit reference is
made to any individual observer,” and that “all subjectivity is avoided by
proper attention to the circumstances required for the well-defined use of
elementary physical concepts” [6, pp. 3, 7]? By no means, for it is not the
case that complementarity implies a choice.
To illustrate his point, de Ronde considers a double slit experiment,
which Subject 1 performs with both slits open and Subject 2 performs with
one slit shut. Subject 1 (who, like Subject 2, appears to owe his informa-
tion about QM to the popular science media) concludes that the “quantum
object” is a wave, while Subject 2 concludes that it is a particle. For de
Ronde this means that quantum reality, giving rise as it does to subject-
dependent conclusions about one and the same object, cannot be objective:
“The real (objective) existence of waves and particles cannot be dependent
on a (subjective) choice of an experimenter.” In point of fact, what we are
dealing with here is not a single situation involving a subject’s choice but
two distinct physical situations within a single objective reality. Nor are the
objects studied in these experiments either classical waves or classical parti-
cles. They are particles only in the sense that they can produce “clicks” in
counters,3 and they are waves only in the sense that the clicks can exhibit
interference fringes.
De Ronde’s mention of “the Bohrian metaphysical premise according to
which the description must be given in terms of classical physics by waves
or particles” suggests that he actually believes that this is what Bohr had in
mind when he insisted on the use of the language of classical physics. Which
in turn suggests that some of the most central tenets of Bohr’s philosophy are
3On the inadequacy of this language see Ulfbeck and Bohr [8] and my [9].
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lost on de Ronde, such as the necessity of defining observables in terms of the
experimental arrangements by which they are measured: the “procedure of
measurement has an essential influence on the conditions on which the very
definition of the physical quantities in question rests” [10]. In other words,
to paraphrase a famous dictum by Wheeler,4 no property (of a quantum
system) or value (of a quantum observable) is a possessed property or value
unless it is a measured property or value. (For extensive discussions of this
point see my [12, 13].)
“One of the main constituents of the present quantum omelette,” de
Ronde points out, “is the idea that measurement is a process which has
a special status within QM.” While ‘measurement’ has a special status to
be sure, it isn’t a process. In fact, QM knows nothing about processes. It
is about measurement outcomes—actual, possible, or counterfactual ones,
performed on the same system at different times or on different systems in
spacelike relation—and their correlations. What happens between a system
preparation and a measurement is anybody’s guess, as the proliferation of
interpretations of QM proves. Given a system preparation, QM gives us the
probabilities with which outcome-indicating events happen, not processes
by which they come about.
Two problems, according to de Ronde, “make explicit how QM has
turned into a ‘quantum omelette’ with no clear limit between an ontological
account and an epistemological one”—“two problems in which the intrusion
of a choosing subject appears explicitly in the determination of what is con-
sidered to be (classically) real—or actual.” The first is the basis problem,
which, so de Ronde,
attempts to explain how is Nature capable of making a choice
between different incompatible bases. Which is the objective
physical process that leads to a particular basis instead of a an-
other one? If one could explain this path through an objective
physical process, then the choice of the experimenter could be
regarded as well as part of an objective process. . . . Unfortu-
nately, still today the problem remains with no solution within
the limits of the orthodox formalism.
That this problem remains unsolved should not come as a surprise. It is in
the nature of pseudo-problems to lack solutions—real solutions, as against
gratuitous ones. The reason this problem is a pseudo-problem is that what
4“No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed) phe-
nomenon” [11].
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happens between a system preparation and a measurement is a phenomenon5
that cannot be dissected into the unitary evolution of a quantum state and
its subsequent “collapse.” There is no Nature making choices, whether be-
tween bases or between possible outcomes. There is no objective physical
process selecting a particular basis. What determines a particular basis is
the measurement apparatus. The fact that the apparatus is usually chosen
by an experimenter, however, is of no consequence as far as the interpreta-
tion of the formalism is concerned. What matters is that the apparatus is
needed not only to indicate the possession of a property by a quantum sys-
tem but also—and in the first place—to make a set of properties available for
attribution to the system. Whether it is anyone’s intention to obtain a par-
ticular kind of information, or whether anyone is around to take cognizance
of it, is perfectly irrelevant.
The second problem, in the words of de Ronde, is this:
Given a specific basis (context or framework), QM describes
mathematically a state in terms of a superposition (of states).
Since the evolution described by QM allows us to predict that
the quantum system will get entangled with the apparatus and
thus its pointer positions will also become a superposition, the
question is why do we observe a single outcome instead of a su-
perposition of them? It is interesting to notice that for Bohr,
the measurement problem was never considered. The reason is
that through his presuppositions, Bohr begun the analysis of QM
presupposing “right from the start” classical single outcomes.
In fact, what allows us to predict the probabilities of the possible out-
comes of a measurement is not the evolution described by QM, for QM
describes no evolution. There are at least nine different formulations of
QM. The better known among them are Heisenberg’s matrix formulation,
Schro¨dinger’s wave-function formulation, Feynman’s path-integral formula-
tion, the density-matrix formulation, and Wigner’s phase-space formulation
[15]. Not all of them feature an evolving quantum state. Yet it stands to
reason that the interpretation of QM ought to depend on what is common
to all formulations of the theory (and thus has a chance of being objec-
5“[A]ll unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves the
fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned
and the character of the possible predictions as regards subsequent observable properties
of that system. Any measurement in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a
fixation of the initial state or to the test of such predictions, and it is first the combination
of measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined phenomenon.” [14].
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tive) rather than on the idiosyncrasies of a particular formulation such as
Schro¨dinger’s.6
Another reason QM describes no evolution is that the quantum calculus
of correlations is time-symmetric. It allows us to assign probabilities not only
to the possible outcomes of a later measurement on the basis of an earlier
measurement but also to the possible outcomes of an earlier measurement
on the basis of a later one.7 It is therefore just as possible to postulate
that quantum states evolve backward in time as it is to postulate that they
evolve forward in time. If the former postulate contributes nothing to our
understanding of QM, then neither does the latter.
Nor does QM allow us to predict that the quantum system will get
entangled with the apparatus pointer—and it had better not, for in the face
of overwhelming evidence that measurements tend to have outcomes, this
would be absurd. What is common to all formulations of QM is that it serves
as a calculus of correlations between measurement outcomes. The reason we
observe a single outcome is therefore simply that without single outcomes the
quantum calculus of correlations would have no application. There would be
nothing to correlate. “[P]resupposing ‘right from the start’ classical single
outcomes” is therefore the only sound way to proceed. Thus, contrary to
what was claimed by de Ronde, the two (pseudo-) problems fail to make
explicit how (or even that) “QM has turned into a ‘quantum omelette’ with
no clear limit between an ontological account and an epistemological one.”
Should (or can) there be a clear limit between the two accounts? Is it
even possible to give an ontological account free of any trace of epistemology,
or an epistemological account free of any trace of ontology? While it is
obviously beyond the scope of the present paper to enter into a discussion of
philosophical issues about which countless volumes have been written, off the
cuff I would say that no ontological account is complete (or even meaningful)
without an epistemological justification, and that no epistemological account
is complete (or serves any purpose) if it does not relate to an ontological
account (epistemology being about knowledge, and knowledge being about
a reality of some kind).
6What is to blame here is the manner in which quantum mechanics is generally taught.
While junior-level classical mechanics courses devote a considerable amount of time to
different formulations of classical mechanics (such as Newtonian, Lagrangian, Hamiltonian,
least action), even graduate-level quantummechanics courses emphasize the wave-function
formulation almost to the exclusion of all variants. This is not only how ψ-ontologists come
to think of quantum states as evolving physical states but also how QBists come to think
of them as evolving states of belief.
7It even allows us to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of a measurement on
the basis of both earlier and later outcomes using the ABL rule [16] rather than Born’s.
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With regard to QM there are two ways to deny this: that of the quantum-
state realist, who is cavalier about epistemological concerns, and that of the
QBist, who is cavalier about ontological concerns. Nothing much needs to
be said about quantum-state realism, inasmuch as this is essentially self-
defeating. Any interpretation of QM that needs to account for the existence
of measurement outcomes—and thus for the existence of measurements,
since no measurement is a measurement if it doesn’t have an outcome—
is thwarted by the non-objectification theorems proved by Mittelstaedt [18,
Sect. 4.3(b)] and the insolubility theorem for the objectification problem due
to Busch et al. [19, Sect. III.6.2].
What about QBism? QBists are right in being cavalier about ontological
concerns if this means being unconcerned about the relation (if any) between
QM and transcendental reality, but they are wrong in being cavalier about
the relation between QM and an objective reality. Most if not all of their
arguments presuppose such a reality,8 whose existence they cannot therefore
consistently deny, just as the philosophical skeptic cannot deny a version of
realism whose truth she presupposes in defending her stance. To bring home
this crucial point, let us assume with Searle [21, pp. 286–87]
that there is an intelligible discourse shared publicly by different
speakers / hearers. We assume that people actually communi-
cate with each other in a public language about public objects
and states of affairs in the world. We then show that a condition
of the possibility of such communication is some form of direct
realism.
The argument Searle is about to present is directed against the sense-datum
theory of perception, according to which all we ever perceive directly—
without the mediation of inferential processes—is our own subjective expe-
riences, called “ideas” by Locke, “impressions” by Hume, and “representa-
tions” by Kant. In one form or another the sense-datum theory was held by
most of the great philosophers in the history of the subject. (QBism may
be seen as a throwback to these bygone days.) The argument begins by as-
suming that we successfully communicate with other human beings at least
some of the time, using publicly available meanings in a public language.
But in order to succeed in communicating in a public language,
we have to assume common, publicly available objects of refer-
ence. So, for example, when I use the expression “this table” I
8For examples the reader is invited to consult my [3, 20].
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have to assume that you understand the expression in the same
way that I intend it. I have to assume we are both referring to
the same table, and when you understand me in my utterance of
“this table” you take it as referring to the same object you refer
to in this context in your utterance of “this table.”
The implication is that “you and I share a perceptual access to one and the
same object.” However, saying that “you and I are both perceiving the same
public object” does not mean that you and I perceive the transcendental
object or “thing in itself.” The “direct realism” Searle is defending is two
removes from this na¨ıve view. By the sense-datum theory we get away from
it, but then we realize that
Once you claim that we do not see publicly available objects
but only sense data, then it looks like solipsism is going to fol-
low rather swiftly. If I can only talk meaningfully about objects
that are in principle epistemically available to me, and the only
epistemically available objects are private sense data, then there
is no way that I can succeed in communicating in a public lan-
guage, because there is no way that I can share the same object
of reference with other speakers.
What else is this public language than the ordinary language the necessity
of whose use Bohr was at such pains to stress? And what else is the gen-
eral object of reference of this language than the objective reality which the
QBists fail to recognize as the proper object of scientific inquiry, and which
de Ronde fails to recognize as the sole reality accessible to scientific inquiry?
By throwing out the baby of objective reality with the bathwater of tran-
scendental reality, QBists have landed themselves on the horns of a dilemma:
insofar as they claim to be exclusively concerned with the subjective experi-
ences of individual “agents” or “users,” they have no way of communicating
their views,9 and insofar as they succeed in communicating, they implicitly
acknowledge an objective reality. It no doubt is an interesting project to
find out how far the Bayesian interpretation of probability can be carried in
the context of QM, but to deny that QM refers to measurement outcomes
indicated by instruments situated in an objective reality is overkill. It is an
overreaction against the realism of the ψ-ontologist, grounded in a common
failure to distinguish between the two kinds of reality.
9This, and not merely the obtuseness of their detractors, appears to be the reason they
seem to have such a hard time making themselves understood.
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A result of this failure is the frequent occurrence of the fallacy known
as “false dilemma”: Either we take a transcendental realist stance or we
must accept that QM does not make reference to anything but beliefs of
“users.” Either we embrace ψ-ontology or we “remain on the surface of in-
tersubjectivity,” using an epistemic approach that restricts our discourse to
the way we interact by communicating empirical findings, leaving aside “the
relation of these interactions to the world and reality themselves” [2, p. 7].
The possibility which remains unconsidered is that QM makes reference to
an objective reality that, while not being the reality of the ψ-ontologist,
is essential to the expression of our beliefs and the communication of our
empirical findings.
De Ronde’s ambivalent assessment of QBism reflects the QBists’ dilemma.
Addressing the horn of solipsism, he writes that QBists
dissolve all important and interesting questions that physical
thought has produced since the origin itself of the theory of
quanta. Taking to its most extreme limit several of the main
Bohrian ideas, QBism has turned physics into a solipsistic realm
of personal experience in which no falsification can be produced;
and even more worrying, where there are no physical problems
or debates left. QBism does not solve the problems of QM, it
simply dissolves them.
Addressing the other horn (i.e., accepting QBists’ ability to communicate in
public language), he claims that “QBists have produced a consistent scheme
that might allow us to begin to unscramble—at least part of—the ‘quantum
omelette’,” though he gives no indication how this might be done. Nor does
he bother to substantiate his extravagant claim that “QBism has seen much
better than Bohr himself the difficult problems involved when applying an
epistemological stance to understand QM”—a claim strangely at odds with
his statement that “[e]ven today [Bohr’s scheme] seems to us one of the
strongest approaches to QM.”
If it were true that “QBism cannot be proven to be wrong,” as de Ronde
claims, QBism would be not even wrong. QBism, however, makes numerous
claims, and some of the fourteen examined in my [3] are wrong, for exam-
ple the claim that there are no external criteria—external to the individual
“user’s” private theater of subjective experiences—for declaring a probabil-
ity judgment right or wrong. In fact, there are objective data—external to
the individual “user” though not, of course, external in the transcenden-
tal sense—on the basis of which probabilities are assigned, notwithstanding
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that the choice of these data and hence the probability assignments depend
on the “user.”
De Ronde claims to “show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe
from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received,” including my
own. What appears to have escaped his notice is that none of my criticisms
were ontological in his sense. While Marchildon, Nauenberg, and myself
are collectively indicted for asking “QBists to answer ontological questions
they have explicitly left aside right from the start,” he offers not a shred of
evidence that his indictment has merit in my case. Our attacks are said to
“come either from the reintroduction of ontological problems,” which is not
true in my case, “or from the unwillingness to understand the radicalness
of the QBist proposal.” Concerning the latter, I beg forgiveness for quoting
from an email I received from Chris Fuchs after posting my [3]: “Thanks for
your paper tonight. I will read it very carefully in the coming days. Your
Section 4 [titled “The central affirmations of QBism”] so impressed me that
I know I *must* read it.” In a message to his QBist colleagues, forwarded
to me in the same email, he further wrote: “The 14 things he lists in Section
4 are remarkably accurate . . . unless I’ve had too much wine tonight.”
In an attempt at defending ψ-ontology, de Ronde points out that “[t]he
foundational discussions that have taken place during the last decades [con-
cerning, among other things, the EPR paper, Bell inequalities, and the
Kochen-Specker theorem] are in strict relation to a realist account of the
theory.” If so, what is the conclusion to be drawn from these discussions if
not that Bohr was right: realist accounts of QM do not work. In the quan-
tum domain, no property or value is a possessed property or value unless
its existence is implied by—indicated by, can be inferred from—an event or
state of affairs in the classical domain. The distinction between a classical
and a quantum domain is thus an inevitable feature of QM. It needs to be
understood, not swept under the rug or explained away.
Again, according to de Ronde, “[a]ll interesting problems which we have
been discussing in the philosophy of science and foundations community
for more than a Century . . . have been in fact the conditions of possibility
for the development of a new quantum technological era”; these problems
“allowed us to produce outstanding developments such as quantum telepor-
tation, quantum cryptography and quantum computation.” Here de Ronde
seems to be speaking off the top of his head, considering that important
contributions to these fields came from QBists and other physicists with no
transcendental realist leanings.
10
2Echoing Kant’s famous dictum that “[t]houghts without content are empty,
intuitions without concepts are blind” [22, p. 193], Bohr could have said
that without measurements the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics
is empty, while measurements without the formal apparatus of quantum
mechanics are blind. What allows us to peer beyond the classical domain
with its apparatuses is the combination of measurement outcomes and their
quantum-mechanical correlations. And what we find if we peer into the
quantum domain is that intrinsically the things we call “particles” are iden-
tical with each other in the strong sense of numerical identity [12, 13]. They
are one and the same intrinsically undifferentiated Being, transcendent of
spatial and temporal distinctions, which by entering into reflexive spatial
relations gives rise to
1. what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the
relations is ignored, and
2. what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the rela-
tions is reified.
In the words of Leibniz: omnibus ex nihilo ducendis sufficit unum—one is
enough to create everything from nothing.
As said, the distinction between a classical and a quantum domain needs
to be understood, and this (if possible) beyond the linguistic necessity of
speaking about the quantum domain in terms of correlations between events
in the classical domain. One reason it is so hard to beat sense into QM is
that it answers a question we are not in the habit of asking. Instead of
asking what the ultimate constituents of matter are and how they interact
and combine, we need to broaden our repertoire of explanatory concepts and
inquire into the manifestation of the familiar world of everyday experience.
Since the kinematical properties of microphysical objects—their positions,
momenta, energies, etc.—only exist if and when they are indicated by the
behavior of macrophysical objects, microphysical objects cannot play the
role of constituent parts. They can only play an instrumental role in the
manifestation of macrophysical objects. Essentially, therefore, the distinc-
tion between the two domains is a distinction between the manifested world
and its manifestation.
The manifestation of the familiar world of everyday experience consists
in a transition from the undifferentiated state of Being to a state that al-
lows itself to be described in the classical language of interacting objects
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and causally related events. This transition passes through several stages,
across which the world’s differentiation into distinguishable regions of space
and distinguishable objects with definite properties is progressively realized.
There is a stage at which Being presents itself as a multitude of formless par-
ticles. This stage is probed by high-energy physics and known to us through
correlations between the counterfactual clicks of imagined detectors, i.e., in
terms of transition probabilities between in-states and out-states. There
are stages that mark the emergence of form, albeit as a type of form that
cannot yet be visualized. The forms of nucleons, nuclei, and atoms can
only be mathematically described, as probability distributions over abstract
spaces of increasingly higher dimensions. At energies low enough for atoms
to be stable, it becomes possible to conceive of objects with fixed numbers
of components, and these we describe in terms of correlations between the
possible outcomes of unperformed measurements. The next stage—closest
to the manifested world—contains the first objects with forms that can be
visualized—the atomic configurations of molecules. But it is only the final
stage—the manifested world—that contains the actual detector clicks and
the actual measurement outcomes which have made it possible to discover
and study the correlations that govern the quantum domain.
One begins to understand why the general theoretical framework of con-
temporary physics is a probability calculus, and why the probabilities are
assigned to measurement outcomes. If quantum mechanics concerns a tran-
sition through which the differentiation of the world into distinguishable
objects and distinguishable regions of space is gradually realized, the ques-
tion arises as to how the intermediate stages are to be described—the stages
at which the differentiation is incomplete and the distinguishability between
objects or regions of space is only partially realized. The answer is that
whatever is not completely distinguishable can only be described by as-
signing probabilities to what is completely distinguishable, namely to the
possible outcomes of a measurement. What is instrumental in the manifes-
tation of the world can only be described in terms of (correlations between)
events that happen or could happen in the manifested world.
The atemporal causality by which Being manifests the world must be
distinguished from its more familiar temporal cousin. The usefulness of the
latter, which links states or events across time or spacetime, is confined
to the world drama; it plays no part in setting the stage for it. It helps
us make sense of the manifested world as well as of the cognate world of
classical physics, but it throws no light on the process of manifestation nor
on the quantum correlations that are instrumental in the process. That
other causality, on the other hand, throws new light on the nonlocality of
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QM, which the QBists so nonchalantly dismiss. The atemporal process by
which Being enters into reflexive relations and matter and space come into
being, is the nonlocal event par excellence. Depending on one’s point of
view, it is either coextensive with spacetime (i.e., completely delocalized) or
“outside” of spacetime (i.e., not localized at all). Occurring in an anterior
relation to space and time, it is the common cause of all correlations, not only
of the seemingly inexplicable ones between simultaneous events in different
locations but also of the seemingly explicable ones between successive events
in the same location.10
The objection may be raised that in positing an intrinsically undiffer-
entiated Being and an atemporal process of manifestation, I have ventured
into transcendental territory. But this is not the case. While Bohr went
beyond Kant only in that he opened up the Kantian world-as-we-know-it,
providing a window on what lies beyond,11 I go beyond Bohr only in that
I use QM to look through this window. It is still essentially the Kantian
categories that I use when speaking of the manifested world as a system
of interacting and causally evolving bundles of possessed properties, and
it is still the quantum-mechanical correlations between outcome-indicating
events in this world that I use to draw my inferences. It is no doubt tempt-
ing to think of Being and the manifested world transcendentally, as if they
existed out of relation to our experience, but of what exists out of relation to
our experience we know zilch. The manifested world exists in relation to our
experience—it is manifested to us—and so does the Being which manifests
it.
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